Abstract: We study a large economy in which firms cannot compute exact solutions to the non-linear equations that characterize the equilibrium price at which they can sell future output. Instead, firms use polynomial expansions to approximate prices. The precision with which they can compute prices is endogenous and depends on the overall level of supply. At the same time, firms' individual supplies, and thus aggregate supply, depend on the precision with which they approximate prices. This interrelation between supply and price forecast induces multiple equilibria, with inefficiently low output, in economies that otherwise have a unique, efficient equilibrium. Moreover, exogenous parameter changes, which would increase output were there no computational frictions, can diminish agents' ability to approximate future prices, and reduce output. Our model therefore accommodates the intuition that interventions, such as unprecedented quantitative easing, can put agents into "uncharted territory".
Introduction
Few people would claim that they are able to compute future equilibrium outcomes, such as prices, with any accuracy. Despite this, textbook models implicitly assume that, given all relevant data, agents compute exact numeric values for future equilibrium prices, respectively, the entire distribution of these prices if the model involves risk. In this paper, we assume that economic agents are computationally constrained to the use of polynomial functions. That is, instead of being able to solve arbitrary non-linear problems, they rely 1 I am particularly indebted to Martin Hellwig for detailed comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
I also thank Dominik Grafenhofer, Sebastian Klein, Harvey Lapan, and Carl Christian von Weizsäcker for discussions on equilibrium models. Finally, I received helpful questions and comments from seminar participants in Bonn. First draft July 2015.
on polynomial expansions to approximate future equilibrium outcomes. Put differently, agents act just like economic researchers who use polynomials, such as the Arrow-Pratt approximation, to restate complicated non-linear problems in terms of workable polynomials.
Using a two-period model, in which firms employ polynomial approximations to infer future selling prices for their output, we find that multiple equilibria emerge in wellbehaved economies that would have a unique, efficient equilibrium if agents could compute future equilibria with perfect accuracy. Moreover, exogenous parameter changes, which would increase economic activity were agents computationally unconstrained, can reduce economic activity as they make it harder for agents to approximate equilibrium prices.
Our results rely on the fact that there are levels of supply where a polynomial approximation to the function, which relates equilibrium supply to equilibrium price, is of good quality, and other levels where it is of low quality. Put differently, a firm's ability to compute equilibrium prices changes with the level of aggregate supply. At the same time, individual supply, and thus aggregate supply, varies with the precision with which agents can predict prices. This interaction gives rise to two coexisting types of equilibria. In the first, economic activity falls into intervals where agents' polynomial approximations are of high quality and the role of the computational friction is small. These equilibria can coincide with the rational expectations equilibrium (REE). In the second type, computational frictions are important and agents find it difficult to predict prices: Aggregate supply is (i) low and (ii) falls into an interval where agents' approximations, to the equation describing equilibrium, are of poor quality.
In one interpretation, we may think of a farmer who must decide in spring how much corn he should plant. This farmer may know the price at which corn tends to sell in years with "normal" supply. Moreover, he might know that small increases in aggregate supply tend to reduce prices, i.e, that demand is locally downward sloping. Finally, he may know that this downward slope tapers off as supply increases. The farmer, however, is unable to calculate all numeric values that the demand function takes over its entire domain. If he wants to calculate those prices, which obtain once supply differs from those levels that he is familiar with, he must use a polynomial expansion to extrapolate the new price. In a macroeconomic interpretation, we think of a large number of firms that have to choose production today in anticipation of future demand. These firms know the price at which their goods sell in "normal times". However, if firms collectively cut production today, it will be difficult for them to know whether future selling prices increase, due to reduced supply, or fall, since the layoffs, associated with production cuts, reduce demand.
2 This intuition extends naturally to economies where demand concerns a vector of goods, which may involve substitutes and complements. In such a setting it appears even more natural to assume that firms cannot solve for the overall equilibrium.
Instead, a firm, which produces a particular good, may, if it is exceptionally well informed, use the economy's Jacobian matrix to compute demand for its particular good in terms of a first-order polynomial approximation.
Regarding parameter changes, the uncertainty that agents face in our model does not originate from a world with stochastically changing parameters. Instead, agents know the magnitude of the parameter change in advance; the difficulty is to predict its consequences.
As an illustration, we refer to two representative comments made on the quantitative Niederhoffer (1997) , p. 381, concludes his discussion on excess demand functions: "The difficulty is that nobody knows what the equilibrium level is until at least the morning after the fact." 6 That is, we know from birth statistics that cohorts entering the labor market will be smaller and cohorts entering retirement will grow. At the same time, it proves difficult to predict how such changes impact future growth paths.
comparative statics correctly, can reduce output. The model therefore accommodates the intuition that interventions, such as unprecedented quantitative easing, can put agents into "uncharted territory", i.e., diminish agent's ability to forecast relevant equilibrium variables. Hence, even though markets work inefficiently, the government's ability to improve market outcomes is limited.
Related Literature: Due to their bounded computational capacity, agents work with an approximate, misspecified model. Except for special cases, they cannot form rational expectations in the sense of Hutchison (1937) , Grunberg and Modigliani (1954), Muth (1961) , Blanchard (1979) and DeCanio (1979) , which are consistent with the true model.
Regarding model misspecification, our approach is thus akin to the literature on learning, Bray (1982) , Marcet and Sargent (1989) , and Sargent (1993) , where agents use a misspecified least squares approach to infer unknown model parameters. Rothschild (1974) and McLennan (1984) model firms that experiment with different supply functions to learn about stochastic demand. Firms in our model are small, and thus changing individual supply has no influence on prices. That is, in the dynamic extension of our model, the information that firms learn over time is determined by overall equilibrium rather than individual experimentation.
We interpret our baseline model as a simple A D , A S setting, as in Keynes (1936) and Samuelson (2009) , which is augmented with a computational friction. In Section 4, we show that our model may be reinterpreted as a Diamond (1982) and Cooper and John (1988) aggregate search model, where the probability of finding a trading partner depends on the equilibrium level of economic activity. In this interpretation, agents' computational constraint makes it difficult for them to compute the equilibrium probability of finding a trading partner. Regarding government intervention, Diamond (1982) and Cooper and John (1988) find positive multipliers, which are due to the search friction.
In the current model, where the search friction is coupled with a computational friction, government intervention has a non-monotonous effect on output. Tesfatsion (2006) , Gintis (2007) , Foley (2009), and Thurner et al. (2012) argue for "agent-based" models in which agents follow decision rules that do not necessarily coincide with rational behavior. 7 In the current paper, agents are computationally 7 One argument for such a departure is computational complexity: Rubinstein (1998), Maymin (2011) and Ackerman et al. (2011) emphasize that agents might be constraint in their ability to count or to compute conditional probabilities. Nelson and Winter (1985) , Ulanowicz (2008) , Hofbauer and Sandholm (2011), Arthur (2015) , and Kuhle (2016) for evolutionary models where biases emerge endogenously.
constrained to the use of polynomial expansions. This case is of special interest since researchers in economics, physics, and engineering indeed rely on first-and second-order polynomial expansions, rather than exact solutions, to understand non-linear problems; equilibrium comparative statics of a well behaved model, y = f (y; b), are commonly evaluated in terms of a first-order polynomial expansion ∆y ≈ ∆yf y + ∆bf b , which yields
8 Hence, we argue that the current model is methodologically consistent in the sense that the outside researcher, i.e., the paper's reader, will use the same method of analysis that is used by the model's agents. Section 2 abstracts from computational frictions and identifies the unique rational expectations equilibrium. Section 2.1 studies equilibria that obtain with computationally constrained agents. Section 2.2 considers the impact of exogenous parameter changes.
Section 3.1 studies the economy's convergence to the rational expectations equilibrium in a dynamic setting, where firms accumulate empirical knowledge. Section 3.2 introduces asymmetric information. In Section 4, we suggest different interpretations of our baseline model. Section 5 concludes.
Model
We study a large economy in which a mass one of firms i ∈ [0, 1] produce a homogenous good. There are two periods of time. In the first period, each firm chooses to produce a quantity of goods a i in anticipation of a future selling priceP . In the second period, firms sell the finished products a i inelastically to consumers at a market clearing price P . For simplicity, to ensure uniqueness of the REE in the economy without computational friction, we assume that aggregate demand is twice continuously differentiable and 8 Similarly, Mas-Colell et al. (1995) , pp. 599-641, use first-order polynomial expansions to examine non-linear demand in pure exchange economies with many commodities. As mentioned earlier, Finetti (1952) , Arrow (1970) , Pratt (1964) use second-order expansions to study expected utility. Likewise, the familiar first-and second-order conditions, f ′ (x 0 ) = 0 and f ′′ (x 0 ) < 0, for a smooth function f (x) to have local maximum at point x 0 , stem from an expansion
see Chiang and Wainwright (2005), pp. 250-253, or Samuelson (1947), pp. 357-379 . Related, the stability of differential and difference equations, Samuelson (1947), pp. 21-121, 257-349, and 380-439, or Galor (2007) . Finally, DeCanio (1979) , p. 52, points out that solving expectations equilibria requires either that the model is assumed to be linear, or that the model's equations have to be linearized, i.e., rewritten in terms of a first-order polynomial, which is what our agents do.
monotonously downward-sloping in goods quantity A:
Demand (1) represents the model's non-linearity, respectively, the computational obstacle that agents have to overcome. In Section 4, we suggest three different interpretations of φ() by showing that it captures the non-linearities that individual agents face when they make forward-looking decisions in the standard workhorse models of Diamond (1965 ), Diamond (1982 , and the A D , A S model of Samuelson (2009) . That is, φ may be interpreted as (i) future returns to savings, (ii) the probability of finding a trading partner, or (iii) the selling price for output.
Firm i chooses a production schedule a * i to maximize expected profits
whereP is the firm's expectation regarding the selling price and 
If agents are computationally unconstrained, they can compute demand (1) over its entire domain. That is, for each level of aggregate supply A, they form rational price expectationsP = φ(A). In turn, they combine (1) and (2) to calculate the unique equilibrium quantity A 0 :
and, using (1), they compute equilibrium price P 0 :
Accordingly, we have Lemma 1. There exists a unique, rational expectations equilibrium {A 0 , P 0 } ∈ R 2 + . In this equilibrium agents forecast prices correctlyP = P 0 .
Proof. Market clearing (3)-(4) determines equilibrium quantity A 0 > 0, which is unique since φ(0) > 0 and φ A < 0. Using (1), the equilibrium price is
Finally, (2) indicates thatP = A 0 and thusP = P 0 .
Polynomial Equilibria
We now assume that firms cannot compute demand over its entire domain. Instead, they are familiar with a point on the demand function, A * , φ(A * ), and the demand function's slope φ A (A * ) at this point. It is convenient to start with the assumption that this point is the REE of Lemma 1, i.e, agents know A 0 , φ(A 0 ), and the slope φ A (A 0 ). In turn, once supply differs from A 0 , agents use polynomial expansions to extrapolate demand to estimate the resulting price. Polynomial equilibrium points will be those points where the polynomial, which mimics true demand, intersects with supply. Put differently, "polynomial equilibria" are those points that solve the agents' approximate model. The REE from the previous section will be one, but not the only, such equilibrium.
Expanding demand (1) around the perfect foresight equilibrium, agents forecast the selling price (1) as:
Equation (5) reflects that agents cannot numerically compute the true price P = φ(A 0 + ∆A) at which a supply A = A 0 + ∆A sells. The reliability of estimate (5) decreases the more aggregate supply A differs from A 0 . 9 We assume that agents choose output a i to maximize:
The profit criterion (6) allows for two interpretations. In the first, a iP − 1 2 a 2 i is the firm's profit given the price estimateP , and −a i τ ∆A 2 reflects that firms, knowing their estimate is based on a first-order expansion, which neglects second-order terms, discount τ > 0 the estimated revenue. In a second interpretation, which we elaborate on in Proposition 2 of Appendix A, −τ represents the demand function's second derivative φ AA . In this case agents do not discount their price estimate, and rely on a second-order Taylor-series expansions to estimate the selling price.
10
9 Note that the model's coefficients throughout can be chosen such that the equilibrium deviation ∆A is arbitrarily small, respectively, such that the approximation (5) is of arbitrarily good quality. 10 That is, if agents knew demand's second derivative, their price estimate (5) would writeP =
Substituting this into (6), and setting the discount rate τ = 0, yields
Comparison indicates that the new profit criterion is equivalent to the old, (6), except for the second-order derivative 1 2 φ AA taking the place of the discount rate −τ .
From (6), we obtain individual and aggregate supply:
Combining supply (7) and estimated demand (5), the equilibrium quantity A, where supply intersects with the demand estimate, is the solution to:
For convenience, we identify equilibria j = 0, 1, 2..., in terms of their distance ∆A j = A j − A 0 to the rational expectations equilibrium A 0 . That is, ∆A j = 0 corresponds to the REE. Using the fact that A 0 = φ(A 0 ), we rewrite (8) as:
and note:
Proposition 1. There exists the rational expectations equilibrium
in which agents' price forecasts are correctP = P 0 . There exists a second equilibrium
Both equilibria in Proposition 1 are self-fulfilling. In the perfect foresight equilibrium, no firm deviates from the equilibrium supply A = A 0 , and thus there is no need for agents to rely on polynomial approximations: Producers know the price φ(A 0 ). The opposite is the case in the second equilibrium: Once firms supply A 1 = A 0 , they are uncertain as to the equilibrium price, φ(A 1 ) = φ(A 0 + ∆A 1 ), which they can only approximate as
Moreover, the error of this approximation, (A − A 0 ) 2 , grows the more agents deviate from supplying A 0 . That is, once firms deviate from the rational expectations equilibrium, they find it harder to estimate future prices and thus they are incentivised to deviate even further until a new equilibrium is reached. In this equilibrium, firms cannot forecast prices accurately, and thus they choose to produce a small number of goods, at a low marginal cost, which provides a margin of safety.
As we argued earlier, this interdependence between aggregate output and the individual firm's ability to understand the environment that it operates in is a crucial aspect in most crises: Once consumers and investors change their behavior, they find themselves in an environment that is hard to understand, and they hold back on investment and consumption decisions waiting for the "dust to settle". In the current interpretation, by cutting production, agents put themselves into "uncharted territory". This aspect is, by assumption, not captured in environments where agents can compute the entire demand function, respectively, solve the model as in Lemma 1. Before we discuss the scope for government to correct such "glitches" in output, which turns out to be limited, we make one remark: The model's coefficients φ A (A 0 ), τ can be chosen such that
< 0 is arbitrarily small. That is, both equilibria in Proposition 1 exist even if the the first-order Taylor-series approximation (5) is of very good quality,
i.e., if the error term is of order O(∆A 2 ).
Parameter Changes
We augment demand P = φ(A; b) to incorporate an exogenous parameter b. This parameter is assumed to increase demand φ b = φ b (A; b) > 0 for every A. This parameter may be seen as government demand or money supply. 11 In this interpretation, the following section identifies the multiplier effect that obtains once agents need to rely on approximations to anticipate the consequences of policy interventions.
We begin with a benchmark model where agents are computationally unconstrained.
Second, we study the model with friction. Comparing both settings shows that parameter increases, which increase demand and equilibrium output in a model with unconstrained agents, can reduce economic activity if firms are computationally constrained. Put differently, parameter changes, in particular if they are large, can put agents into "uncharted territory", and incentivise them to cut, rather than increase, output.
Comparative statics without friction
Recalling our augmented demand function:
firms can anticipate the equilibrium price P correctly, if they are computationally unconstrained as in Lemma 1. Hence, they choose a production schedule a * i which maximizes profits a * i = arg max
11 Alternatively, as we discuss in Section 4, the model may be interpreted as the capital market of an overlapping generations economy, where a i , A, φ() are, respectively, individual savings and aggregate savings, and φ(A) is the marginal product of capital that agents expect to receive on their savings. Finally, b may be seen as public debt and A 0 as steady state capital.
Taken together (9) and (10) yield a unique equilibrium P 0 , A 0 for every given exogenous parameter b 0 . Once the parameter changes from b 0 to b 1 = b 0 + ∆b, the price is again correctly anticipated as the unique solution P 1 , A 1 to the equations P = A and P = φ(A; b 0 + ∆b).
How would an actual human being, or an economic researcher, try to think about the impact of the parameter change? The outside researcher, who uses textbook methods to study how changes in the exogenous parameter from b 0 to b 1 change output and price, cannot compute A and P explicitly. Instead, he will approximate the model's comparative statics. That is, he will differentiate (9) and (10):
Combining (11) and (12) yields the model's comparative statics:
Lemma 2. Exogenous parameter variations ∆b change output (and price) according to
That is, an outside observer/analyst would use a polynomial expansion of A = φ(A; b), P = φ(A; b) to approximate the impact of an exogenous parameter change as in Lemma 2. In the following section, we assume that firms themselves make such "polynomial inference" using such an approximation to anticipate the consequences of parameter changes.
Comparative statics with computationally constrained agents
Using a first-order expansion, around A 0 = φ(A 0 ; b 0 ), agents approximate the equilibrium
That is, agents have to incorporate two aspects in their demand forecast: (i) the direct effect of the parameter change ∆b and (ii) the equilibrium response of all agents who deviate ∆A = 0 from their usual supply choice. As before, agents discount the price estimate since they do not know how curvature terms of demand φ AA , φ bb , and φ Ab affect prices:
To find the equilibria associated with (13) and (14), it is useful to distinguish cases where ∆A ≥ 0 from cases where ∆A ≤ 0.
We begin by looking for equilibria where ∆A ≥ 0, ∆b ≥ 0. If ∆A ≥ 0 and ∆b ≥ 0 then supply equals approximate demand (14), when:
and thus:
Combining the two equilibrium candidates in (15) , there exists an equilibrium in which, compared to the perfect foresight equilibrium, production (and price) are increased:
At the margin, increases in the parameter increase income if
Proof. Follows directly from (15).
To interpret the equilibrium in Lemma 3, we study how it corresponds to the REE of Proposition 1. That is, we note that lim ∆b→0 ∆A 1 (∆b) = 0, i.e., the equilibrium quantity , an equilibrium ∆A > 0 cannot exist.
Regarding the remaining equilibria, where ∆A ≤ 0, we recall (13) and (14), and note that −|∆A| = ∆A. Accordingly, there are two candidates
In view of (16), if ∆b <
, there exists exactly one equilibrium, in which 
Extensions
So far agents were assumed to know the rational expectations equilibrium A 0 , φ(A 0 ).
In Section 3.1, we study a dynamic setting where agents learn different points on the demand curve over time. In turn, we examine how the economy converges to the REE.
Second, in our baseline setting, all agents know the same point on the demand curve.
Price forecasts and supply decisions are therefore the same across agents. Once different agents know different pieces of the demand curve, this is no longer true. Rather than knowing each other's price forecasts and supplies, agents have to estimate price and supply simultaneously. In Section 3.2, we extend our model to incorporate such asymmetric information in a manner which is akin to Bayesian inference.
Learning
We abstracted from the fact that agents may learn from past mistakes, i.e., suboptimal production choices that were based on incorrect price estimates. One would imagine that they memorize these mistakes, or the observation that a quantity A 1 is associated with an observable price P 1 = φ(A 1 ). Under our current assumptions on the demand function, this price differs from the estimated priceP 1 . Hence, agents would not supply A 1 again.
Second, if agents are computationally constrained to the use of polynomials, how do they find the perfect foresight equilibrium in the first place? This section's main observation is that agents will learn the REE over time.
Agents who sell repeatedly into the market will, over time t = 0, 1, 2, 3..., observe an increasing number of points on the demand curve. Regarding these points,
we assume that agents also learn demand's slope φ A (A t ) once a quantity A t is marketed.
Given past observations A t , t = 0, 1, 2, 3, ..., T agents can refine their price estimate as:
.T(17)
That is, to estimate prices, they select from the set of known points {A t } T t=0 the point A * , which is closest to the future supply A T +1 . Put differently, they use the observation A * from the past, which is most similar/closest to the situation they are trying to make inference on. In turn, agents i choose supply
Hence, for a given A * , there are two equilibrium candidates
To show that (17) and (19) ensure that agents learn the REE equilibrium A 0 , φ(A 0 ), we proceed in two steps. First, we study the case where demand φ() is a convex function. In this case, convergence to the REE can be studied in terms of a simple first-order difference equation. Second, for the remaining cases, we give an indirect argument in Appendix C.
Convex Demand
Without loss of generality, we assume that agents start with a prior µ, φ(µ), µ < A 0 .
Moreover, we focus on the "+" roots of (19). For convex demand, we now show that (17) and (19) imply a first-order difference equation for supply:
First, we note that (20) 
This steady state equilibrium is stable due to our assumption that φ is downward-sloping: For A T < A 0 , we have φ(A T ) − A T > 0 and thus A T +1 > A T . At A 0 , the system is locally stable since
To complete the argument, we note that the sequence {A t } T t=1 is strictly increasing, and, due to our convexity assumption on φ, that A t ≤ A 0 ∀t = 0, 1, 2....T .
13 That is, A T always adjusts towards, but not beyond, A 0 . Hence, according to (17), agents will always use the information that they learned in the previous period, when a quantity A T was marketed, to think about A T +1 . This last property allows us to study convergence in terms of the first-order difference equation (20).
Asymmetric Information
One may suspect that heterogeneity in information might mitigate the possibility of multiple equilibria that we emphasize. 14 Moreover, one might expect that dispersion of private information induces some agents to supply too little and others too much such that, on average, errors cancel and supply might actually be at an efficient level. 15 Regarding 13 To see this, recall (17) and (18), which imply
At the same time, convexity of φ implies:
Taking both inequalities together, we have
respectively, A T +1 ≤ A 0 . Where A T +1 ≤ A 0 , follows from φ being downward-sloping and A = φ(A)
at A = A 0 . Hence, if we start at a point µ − φ(µ) < 0, this implies that A T +1 ≤ A 0 ∀T . Finally, as mentioned before, if demand is non-convex, A t can overshoot A 0 . In that case we require an additional argument, which we give in Appendix C. 14 See, e.g., Morris and Shin (1998) for a coordination problem where asymmetric information selects unique equilibria in an economy with a continuum of players. 15 See Galton (1907) , and Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) for such wisdom of the crowd effects.
these conjectures, we find that (i) multiplicity carries over to the case with dispersed private information and (ii) that dispersed information tends to amplify (dampen) supply if demand is concave (convex).
Each agent i ∈ [0, 1] is assumed to know the selling price φ(A i ) and demand's first derivative φ A (A i ) of a particular supply A i ∈ [0, ∞]. Agents are distributed over these points according to an integrable density function f (). For simplicity, we normalize agents' discount rate to τ = 1.
Conditional on information
whereP |A i andÂ|A i are agent i ′ s price and supply forecasts conditional on knowing demand φ(A i ) at point A i . The polynomial estimates for price and quantity are:
andÂ
Where (23) reflects that agent i uses his information at point A i to infer the information and thus the supply of the other agents who know a different point A j . That is, agent i knows that agent j observes a point on the same demand curve and thus he uses a polynomial expansion around φ(A i ) to estimate the information φ(A j ), φ A (A j ) that player j receives. Based on this reasoning, i can construct an estimate for the other players' price estimates, which he needs to calculate aggregate supply. Agent i ′ s price and supply estimates are thus given by the simultaneous solution of (22)- (23). In turn, he can choose supply (21). We solve the model in Appendix E using a guess-and-verify approach.
These solutions yield two main insights. First, as in Proposition 1, multiple equilibria exist due to the interaction between agents' ability to forecast the equilibrium and aggregate supply. Second, unlike the earlier model, where information was symmetric, we show in Lemma 4 that output is depressed across all equilibria since agents systematically underestimate demand if the true demand function is convex. Moreover, the marginal cost of production differs among producers, and thus output, in addition to being low, is produced inefficiently.
Interpretations
In this section, we reinterpret our model in terms of the three macroeconomic workhorse frameworks: (i) aggregate search models of the Diamond (1982) type, (ii) Life-cycle savings models of the Diamond (1965) type, and (iii) models of supply and demand as in
Samuelson (2009) and Mas-Colell et al. (1995) .
1) Search:
In the context of the Diamond (1982) , p. 887, model, agents face the following choice problem:
Where a i is individual i ′ s output choice in Period 1, and φ(A; b 0 ) is the probability with which agents find a trading partner in Period 2. If a trading partner is found, agent i can sell/exchange goods at price one. Finally, f (a i ) is the cost of production.
The chance of finding a trading partner, φ(A; b 0 ), is an increasing function in aggregate economic activity A = [0,1] a i di and government demand b. Diamond (1982) shows that such an economy can have multiple REE equilibria, which we call, say, A 0 , A 1 . Suppose now that agents know one of these REE, e.g., A 0 ; then, if they are computationally constrained, as in the present paper, they would need to use a polynomial expansion to compute the probability φ(A 0 + ∆A) of finding a trading partner that would prevail once agents collectively deviate ∆A from producing A 0 . The same applies to the evaluation of the exogenous policy parameter b, which may, unlike in Diamond (1982) , result in a negative multiplier effect, as discussed in Section 2.2.
2) Savings and Investment: In the context of the Diamond (1965) model, φ() may be interpreted as a component to agents' consumption savings problem:
where factor prices are functions of the prevailing capital-labor ratios k t and k t+1 :
To make choice (24), agents have to form expectations regarding equilibrium interest
In equilibrium, the life-cycle savings condition, (1 + n)k t+1 = s t , relates savings and capital; n representing the exogenous rate of population growth.
Suppose now that the economy is initially in a steady state at k 0 , s 0 . To compute future interest rates, agents have to compute
) =: φ(s t ; n). Once again, if agents know the prevailing interest in the steady state, they have to engage in polynomial expansions to form price expectationsr t+1 to compute the interest rate that obtains in the (temporary) equilibria that obtain once agents choose savings s t = s 0 +∆s t .
This argument extends to the case where agents supply labor in both periods. In that case, to make their savings decision, agents have to (i) approximate the interest rate and
(ii) the second-period wage rate. That is, they have to approximate the Samuelson (1962) neoclassical factor-price frontier, w t+1 = ξ(r t+1 (k t+1 (s t ))), which relates wages to interest, interest to the capital intensity, and finally the capital intensity to savings.
3) Supply and Demand: Our lead interpretation was that of a simplified A D , A S setting. Taking this perspective, we suggest one reason why demand analysis may be computationally complicated for firms. Suppose demand is given by
where ξ represents demand, which is downward-sloping in supply and prices for the other goods L \ l, influence demand, and thus price, for good l. In turn, if this firm is exceptionally well-informed, it might know the entries of the economy's Jacobian matrix. However, it need not know demand's second-and cross-derivatives, which once again makes it difficult to compute demand correctly.
Conclusion
Economists' forecasting record suggests that it is difficult to compute future economic events. The current model recognizes this and assumes that agents cannot compute exact numeric values for future equilibrium outcomes such as prices.
The model's key feature is that the precision with which agents can approximate fu-ture equilibrium prices depends on the level of aggregate economic activity, and is thus endogenous. This interdependence between aggregate output and an individual firm's ability to forecast the price at which it can sell its output gives rise to equilibria in which economic activity is inefficiently low. Such equilibria may be interpreted as "glitches" of the overall economy. During such a glitch, agents collectively reduce economic activity.
This change in behavior makes it difficult to forecast the resulting equilibrium, which, in turn, justifies the initial output cut. For similar reasons we also find that the scope for government to correct such "glitches" in output is limited: Interventions, which would unambiguously increase output in a frictionless economy, can make it harder for firms to predict future equilibria and reduce output even further. Our model therefore captures the common place observation that large parameter changes, such as unprecedented quantitative easing, can put agents into "uncharted territory".
The particular form in which equilibria obtain depends on the assumption that agents use the same Taylor-series expansions that an economic researcher, who applies standard textbook methods, would use. More sophistication on the part of agents will undoubtedly change the specific form and number of equilibria. However, it appears unlikely that the precision with which future equilibrium outcomes are approximated can ever be entirely independent of the overall level of economic activity, which is what our findings rely on.
A Second-order Expansions
In this appendix, we derive our results for a setting where agents know of demand's first and second derivatives. They can thus use second-order expansions to estimate prices:
We study the equilibria that emerge once agents are averse τ > 0 to the third-order error.
Setting τ = 0, we obtain the equilibria that emerge if agents are indifferent regarding errors. Using the estimate (25), firms choose a profit-maximizing quantity:
Individual and aggregate supply are thus
Combining (25) and (26), we obtain:
Recalling that A 0 = φ(A 0 ), (27) writes:
If τ = 0 we have: 
Proof. Using (28), we find the perfect foresight equilibrium ∆A 0 = 0. To identify the remaining equilibria, we distinguish cases (i) ∆A < 0 and (ii) ∆A > 0.
1.) Assuming ∆A < 0: we note that |∆A 3 | = −∆A 3 . Dividing by ∆A, we find that (28) 
It thus violates the initial assumption ∆A < 0.
2.) Assuming ∆A > 0: we note that |∆A 3 | = ∆A 3 and find that (28) has two real roots ∆A 1,2 = 1 4τ
. Both of these roots are negative if φ AA < 0 violating the assumption ∆A > 0. Hence, φ AA > 0 is a sufficient condition for ∆A > 0 equilibria to exist.
The polynomial equilibria in propositions 1-4 have in common that they originate from a coordination problem: In their price forecasts, each agent takes the overall supply A as given. In equilibrium, however, aggregate supply depends on agents' price forecasts.
Hence, the price forecast itself is an equilibrium outcome. At this point, it is clear that higher-order polynomials yield even more equilibria, and that propositions 1-4 carry over qualitatively once we introduce demand Φ(A), for a vector A of goods.
B Alternative Discounting
The price estimate is as before:
The model differs in agents' discounting:
According to (30) there are two regimes. First, agents fear that they miscalculate the impact of the exogenous parameter change in case ∆b > ∆A. Second, agents fear that they misjudge the other agents' reaction to the exogenous parameter variation ∆A > ∆b.
To analyze the equilibrium outcomes associated with (29) and (30), we distinguish cases where the parameter change is relatively large, |∆b| > |∆A|, from cases where its impact is relatively small, |∆b| < |∆A|. Note that |∆A| is a function of |∆b|. That is, we start with the assumption that, e.g., |∆b| > |∆A| and solve for the equilibrium ∆A. In turn,
we check whether the initial assumption |∆b| > |∆A| is correct. This leaves us with equilibria where agents are more concerned about the potential error associated with aggregate supply changes. In these cases, agents are primarily afraid that they forecast prices incorrectly due to the change ∆A. For cases where |∆b| < |∆A| we have: Proposition 5. There exists an upper bound ∆b 1 > 0 and an equilibrium where
there exists an upper bound ∆b 2 > 0 and a second equilibrium
Proof. Individual supply is a i =P − max[∆A 2 , ∆b 2 ] under the assumption that |∆b| < |∆A|, we have a i =P − ∆A 2 . Aggregate supply is thus
Both roots are real since we assumed φ b > 0 and ∆b > 0. It remains to specify the conditions under which our initial hypothesis |∆b| < |∆A| holds. We start with
(1 − φ A )) 2 and note (i) ∆A 1 (∆b = 0) = −(1 − φ A ) such that |∆b| = 0 < |∆A|, (ii) the derivative
vanishes as ∆b becomes large. Taken together, (i) and (ii) imply that an upper bound ∆b 1 exists, such that |∆b| < |∆A| as long as ∆b ∈ [0, ∆b 1 ]. Similarly, regarding the second equilibrium
(1 − φ A )) 2 , we note that (i) ∆A 2 (∆b = 0) = 0 such that |∆b| = |∆A| = 0, (ii) the derivative
(1−φ A )) 2 = 0. Taken together, (i) and (ii) imply that if
exists an upper bound ∆b 2 such that |∆b| < |∆A| as long as ∆b ∈ [0, ∆b 2 ].
The first equilibrium in Proposition 5 corresponds to the perfect foresight equilibrium, ∆A = 0 of Proposition 1: In the limit, where the parameter change becomes infinitesimally small, we obtain ∆A = 0. In this equilibrium, increases in b indeed increase equilibrium supply provided that these increases are small such that ∆b < ∆b 1 < ∆b 2 . In the second equilibrium, which corresponds to the crisis equilibrium in Proposition 1, output is strictly decreasing in b.
Taken together, Propositions 4 and 5 suggest that bold interventions by the government tend to reduce economic activity as such changes make it more difficult for agents to forecast prices. Moreover, in the crisis equilibrium ∆A 2 , government interventions, which would increase output were there no computational frictions, always reduce income.
C Learning The REE
We have shown that agents can learn the A 0 equilibrium if (i) demand is convex and (ii) agents always coordinate on the "+" equilibrium. We now show that agents also learn the REE if (i) demand is not convex, and (ii) when agents, e.g., alternate between playing the "+" and "-" root equilibria.
We write the equilibrium condition as:
The left-hand side of (31) represents the difference between supply and demand in an equilibrium where agents use their knowledge of A * , φ(A * ) to estimate the price. This difference is 0 in the perfect foresight equilibrium where A 0 = φ(A 0 ). Regarding the right-hand side, we define ε = (A − A * ), which yields
over time as agents observe an increasing number of price quantity pairs {φ(A t ), A t } T t=0 . The distance ε = (A − A * ) between the aggregate supply A and the point of estimation
Once we denote the equilibrium supply by
we can write the equations that determine equilibrium as
A(ψ) := ψA ψ (A * , A(ψ)) + (1 − ψ)A 1−ψ (A * * , A(ψ))
A ψ (A * , A(ψ)) =P ψ − (A(ψ) − A * ) A ψ (A * * , A(ψ)) =P 1−ψ − (A(ψ) − A * * )(37)
Solving (36)- (39) for supply A(ψ) yields: 
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E Asymmetric Information Equilibria
We solve the model in two steps. First, we guess the equilibrium outcome. Given this guess, we solve the estimation problem for agent i. Second, we solve for the equilibrium and verify our guess.
4) Problem of an individual agent:
To find the optimal supply of an individual agent, we must solve (22)-(23). To do so, we start with the guess that agent i beliefs that agents j hold the same believe over aggregate supply that he holds himself, i.e., A|A i = (Â|A j )|A i =Â. Given this guess, we show that:
17 The root −q + ( Put differently, equation (40) means that agent i believes that agents j observe points, which lie on his estimated demand curve. That is, agent i knows that agent j estimates the price aŝ P |A j = φ(A j ) + φ A (A j )(Â|A j − A j ), and thus i estimatesP |A j as:
where
Taken together, (41)- (43) mean that agent i uses polynomials to approximate the demand curve upon which the other player observes a point A j , φ(A j ), φ A (A j ). Using (42)- (43), (41) rewrites:
Agent i thus believes that agent j will work with a price estimate that is identical to the one he uses himself and thus he will conclude that j ′ s supply forecast is identical to his own, such thatÂ|A i = (Â|A j )|A i =Â, which confirms our initial guess. It remains to solve (22)- (23) for player i ′ s forecast in the two equilibria A 1,2 :
5) Equilibrium: From (45) we calculate equilibrium supply as:
Concerning the equilibrium quantity A k , k = 1, 2, we note Lemma 4. If demand φ is quasi-convex, then equilibrium output across both equilibria A k , k = 1, 2 falls short of efficient output A 0 .
Proof. To compare equilibrium output (46) to efficient output A 0 , we recall that A 0 = φ(A 0 ). We also recall that, for convex functions f , we have f
. In the current context, this means that agents tend to underestimate convex demand functions:
recalling (44) we have:
Put differently, agents supply less than the efficient quantity since (i) they underestimate demand and (ii) since they know that their price estimate is inaccurate.
The equilibria in (46), feature two sources of inefficiency. First, aggregate output falls short of the efficient level A 0 . Second, since price estimates vary, output and the marginal cost of output differ across firms. Aggregate output is thus produced inefficiently.
